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On the self-serving use of equity in international climate
negotiations
Abstract
We discuss self-serving uses of equity in international climate negotiations. Using unique data from a
world-wide survey of agents involved in international climate policy, we show that the perceived
support of different equity rules by countries can be explained by the ranking of their economic costs.
Despite being self-serving, equity arguments may be perceived as being used for different reasons, e.g.
out of fairness considerations or to facilitate of negotiations. Consistent with experimental and
behavioral studies, we find empirical evidence for self-serving biases: individuals are more likely to
state reasons with positive attributes if they evaluate countries that support the individual's personally
preferred equity rule. Negotiators perceive countries' use of equity as less influenced by pressure from
interest groups.
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“We talk on principle but we act on interest.’’      
— William Savage Landor (1775-1864) 
1  Introduction 
Bargaining situations and negotiations frequently look like a strife for fairness. While bar-
gainers are arguing to get their “fair share” when they feel disadvantaged, the meaning of 
“fair” is often heavily debated. Negotiations therefore become more complicated when there 
is more than one justifiable fairness norm (Raiffa 1982, p.268). Here, negotiators could poten-
tially pick those fairness principles which justify additional demands from their side. Besides 
being prevalent in daily life, equity criteria are also ubiquitously used in the international 
arena when it comes to negotiating multilateral agreements. However, their role and impor-
tance in shaping negotiation processes has drawn only limited attention in the literature. This 
paper attempts to fill this gap by studying the importance of equity criteria in the formulation 
of negotiation positions of major parties in the UNFCCC (UN Framework Convention on 
Climate Change) process. Based on a world-wide survey of agents involved in international 
climate policy, we both provide evidence that equity use is driven by material self interest and 
generalize findings in behavioral literature on self-serving biases in fairness perceptions. 
Equity criteria are discussed in the literature in different ways. They are sometimes seen as 
guiding the negotiations (“focal points”, Schelling 1960) and thereby as means to reduce the 
negotiation costs. Bosello et al. (2001) study the stability of international agreements if based 
on a single equity rule but do not find major improvements upon the relatively pessimistic 
predictions from traditional economic models of coalition formation (Barrett 1994, Carraro 
and Siniscalco 1993, Hoel 1993). Lange and Vogt (2003) and Lange (2006) take a different 
approach and model preferences which trade-off payoffs with equity concerns. Such equity 
preferences can potentially increase cooperation rates but are based on the assumption that 
countries evaluate their position based on a single given equity criterion.  
However, in the international negotiations on the mitigation of climate change, different no-
tions of equity have been proposed. The UNFCCC recognizes the principle of “common but 
differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities”. Notions like “equal per capita 
emissions”, “polluter-pays”, or “sovereignty” all show different interpretations of fairness. 
Referring to this variety of equity criteria, Ringius et al. (2002, p. 3) state that “notions of 
fairness can provide a basis for an international regime only if there is a certain minimum of 
consensus among its members about what is fair and what is unfair”. 
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The perception of fairness may however differ across parties. Several strands of economic as 
well as psychological literature indicate that the understanding of what is fair is – at least to a 
certain extent – driven by economic costs of the respective equity rules: Babcock et al. (1995) 
consider this “self-serving bias in judgments of fairness” in an experimental bargaining situa-
tion. Babcock and Loewenstein (1997) review psychological and experimental evidence for 
this interaction between fairness perceptions and material payoffs. Self-serving social com-
parisons from teacher contract negotiations are discussed by Babcock et al. (1996). In a dif-
ferent approach, Hennig-Schmidt (2002) shows the self-serving use of equity arguments in a 
video-bargaining experiment. When different conflicting fairness principles exist, the negotia-
tions process therefore involves a weighing and reconciliation of the different proposed equity 
bases for a potential agreement.  
In this paper we start with the hypothesis that equity criteria are used by the respective parties 
to influence the negotiations process in their own (material) self-interest. We assume that due 
to the consensus driven nature of international cooperation, parties back their proposals with 
some notion of equity in order to increase their acceptability in the negotiation process. 
Statements about fairness thereby legitimate further demands in the bargaining process and 
permit “the pursuit of self-interest with minimal condemnation or other costs” (Albin 2001, 
p.19). We hypothesize that the use of equity arguments is self-serving, i.e. purely tactical. Just 
as traditional views on bargaining in the game-theoretic literature assume a balancing of con-
flicting demands by self-interested parties, the bargaining process in this paper is seen as bal-
ancing of demands where the bargaining power of the respective parties depends on the pos-
sibility of using self-serving equity criteria supporting their demands. We therefore consider 
equity issues as an important element to understanding negotiation outcomes. 
To provide empirical evidence for this self-serving use of equity criteria, we study interna-
tional climate negotiations as an example. We concentrate on four major parties involved in 
climate negotiations: the European Union (EU), the Group of 77 and China (G77/China),1 
Russia, and the United States of America (USA). We first use the POLES model (Criqui 
2001) to project the costs for the respective countries or groups of countries when abatement 
burdens are allocated using the different equity criteria. The implied cost rankings of the eq-
uity criteria inform our predictions for a self-serving use of equity.  
                                                 
1 The Group of G77 was established in 1964 and today comprises more than 130 developing countries, including 
China and India (www.g77.org).  
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We then perform an econometric analysis based on data from a world-wide survey of agents 
involved in international climate policy to assess the views of the negotiation positions of the 
respective countries or groups of countries. We find that the perceived incorporation of equity 
principles is in general consistent with our hypothesis of a self-serving use of equity criteria. 
Our study also sheds an interesting light on different perceptions of reasons for using equity 
arguments: for example, participants have a more positive view on countries that support an 
equity criterion which reflects the personal preference of the participant. Furthermore, nego-
tiators state that countries use of equity is less due to pressure from interest groups. Together, 
these findings lend support to the self-serving use of equity in international negotiations as 
well as to self-serving distortions in the views on fairness. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: in section 2 we describe the different eq-
uity principles in international climate policy. In section 3, we provide predictions on equity 
use in negotiations based on behavioral findings. We then report economic costs implied by 
the different equity criteria in section 4. Section 5 discusses our empirical findings based on 
the survey data. The final section concludes. 
2  Equity principles in international climate policy 
The nature of the climate change problem allows decomposing policy decisions into those on 
the climate target (i.e., the aggregate greenhouse gas emission reductions) and those on the 
distribution of cost burdens which is crucial in evaluating the equity consequences of any 
given proposal. While the strength of the climate target is certainly a major criterion for the 
acceptability of any future international climate agreement, negotiations in the past centered 
to a large extent around questions on how the burdens of some global abatement effort should 
be distributed. In this paper, we concentrate on the issue of distributing a given burden or – 
equivalently – of distributing an exogenously given surplus from concluding the agreement.  
While the economic literature usually assumes that agents are exclusively concerned with the 
economic costs and benefits, equity arguments are frequently used in international environ-
mental negotiations. They can enter the negotiation position in different ways (Ringius et al. 
2002, Albin 2001): actors might dislike being treated or treating others unfairly, equity could 
serve as constraint on the substantiation of bargaining positions, or equity criteria could serve 
as focal points. Consistent with payoff-maximizing behavior, in this paper we assume that the 
use of equity is driven by self-interest to influence the bargaining outcome in ones favor. 
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For example, developing countries as well as environmental interest groups in industrialized 
countries claim that developed countries with high per capita greenhouse gas emissions are 
responsible for global warming and must take the lead in combating climate change. As a 
consequence, weaker obligations for developing countries can be based on equity arguments. 
Another dimension of equity issues is concerned with a fair distribution of burdens among 
countries with comparable per capita GDP and industry structure. Here, often similar reduc-
tion targets are seen as fair: some proposals during the international climate negotiations allo-
cated emission reduction targets based on present or recent emission levels (Cazorla and To-
man 2001, Raymond 2003).  
Several studies identify different typologies of equity principles. We follow Ringius et al. 
(2002) and concentrate on the following equity principles which dominate the political and 
the academic debate on international climate policy:2 
• The egalitarian rule (EGA): this rule incorporates the principle of equal per capita emis-
sions. It implies that a country whose population amounts to x% of the global population 
should get x% of the global entitlements for greenhouse gas emissions. 
• The sovereignty rule (SOV): this rule incorporates the principle of equal percentage re-
duction of current emissions. It implies that a country whose greenhouse gas emissions 
amount to x% of the global greenhouse gas emissions should get x% of the global emis-
sions entitlements.  
• The polluter-pays rule (POL): this rule incorporates the principle of equal ratio between 
abatement costs and emissions. It implies that a country whose greenhouse gas emissions 
amount to x% of the global emissions should bear x% of the global abatement costs. 
• The ability-to-pay rule (ABI): this rule incorporates the principle of equal ratio between 
abatement costs and GDP. It implies that a country whose GDP amounts to x% of global 
gross product should bear x% of the global abatement costs. 
 
                                                 
2 Besides these main equity rules, two accompanying principles are often discussed: the poor losers rule which 
limits the burdens of poor countries and the stand alone criterion which prevents countries from benefitting from 
an agreements without bearing any costs. While we included these accompanying equity criteria in the first part 
of our survey (see Lange et al. 2007), we did not assess the reasons why countries might support them. There-
fore, we exclude the poor losers and the stand-alone rule from the discussion in this paper.  
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3  On bargaining power and the self-serving use of equity rules 
In Nash’s (1950) seminal work on bargaining, all the differences of the players were suppos-
edly captured in the disagreement point and the shape of the bargaining set. Many other ex-
planations for the bargaining power have been suggested since then – not least differences in 
time or risk preference (Roth 1979). However, if one follows many negotiation processes, 
parties often refer to “fairness” arguments or natural entitlements in order to convince the 
other party to agree to their demands.  
Chun and Thomson (1992) and Herrero (1998) extend the Nash bargaining framework to in-
corporate individual claims.3 Consistent with these approaches, most of the previous literature 
considers entitlements as “legal property rights” (e.g., Konow 1996, 2000, 2001). The payoff 
to a player in these (axiomatic) solutions is increasing in his legal claim. Recently, Gächter 
and Riedl (2005) studied the effects of “moral property rights” on bargaining. Here, individual 
views on fairness inform the bargaining situation and thereby influence the bargaining out-
come. That is, the entitlements or individual claims are not given by some (incompatible) le-
gal property rights but by what bargainers perceive as a fair agreement.  
Similar to these approaches, the frequency of equity arguments in negotiations indicates that 
there is an interaction between bargaining power, i.e. the ability to influence the negotiation 
outcome favorably, and the availability of equity arguments: for example, if all equity criteria 
would require for a negotiating party to receive a larger share of the surplus, this party is 
likely to be able to influence the bargaining outcome in its favor. Conversely, the lack of an 
equity or fairness argument for one’s position would in our view result in a reduction of bar-
gaining power. The end result of negotiations can therefore hardly be understood without ana-
lyzing the underlying equity notions and their use by the respective parties. 
There is substantial evidence that individual perceptions of “what is fair” are correlated with 
the economic costs and benefits implied by the respective equity notions (e.g., Babcock and 
Loewenstein 1997, Dahl and Ransom 1999). These differing perceptions also show in the use 
of the respective equity principles as arguments in bargaining processes (Hennig-Schmidt 
                                                 
3 A bargaining with claims environment adds to the bargaining set and the disagreement point, which form the 
Nash bargaining environment, a claims point. Chun and Thomson (1992) as well as Herrero (1998) provide axi-
oms in which the bargaining solution basically is given by a linear combination of the claims and the disagree-
ment point (or undisputed claims point). 
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2001).4 This could be the case for two reasons: (i) a self-serving bias, i.e. individuals could 
subconsciously interpret fairness in a way that benefits their interests, or (ii) a conscious deci-
sion on self-serving use of equity, i.e. individuals may use specific fairness notions to con-
sciously pursue their own interest while exploiting others’ sense of justice. (e.g., Dahl and 
Ransom 1999, Konow 2001). Evidence for the subconscious self-serving bias has been found 
by Messick and Sentis (1979), Thompson and Loewenstein (1979), and others while, for ex-
ample, Dahl and Ransom (1999) and Gächter and Riedl (2005) find relatively little evidence. 
In either way, a self-serving perception and/or use of equity is essential in explaining bargain-
ing outcomes if a party successfully influences the bargaining process in its favor by referring 
to equity arguments.  
In this paper, we empirically examine parallels of these findings on individual behavior in a 
context of international negotiations. Using the example of international climate policy, we 
consider four equity criteria egalitarian, sovereignty, ability-to-pay, and polluter-pays. Based 
on the arguments and empirical findings outlined above, each negotiating party can be pre-
dicted to use equity arguments which lead to lower costs compared to other equity criteria. 
Furthermore, the perceptions of reasons of using equity arguments (e.g., fairness vs. material 
self-interest) are predicted to be influenced by the personal background of participants, e.g. 
whether they evaluate their own or a different country or group of countries.  
4  The economic costs of different equity principles 
As a first step, we generate predictions on which equity criteria the respective parties prefer 
by comparing the costs implied by distributing the burdens of abating CO2 emissions accord-
ing to the respective equity criteria. We assume that the aggregate emissions target is exoge-
nous and an emissions trading system equalizes the marginal abatement costs across all coun-
tries. For any given overall target (or equivalently, any given marginal abatement costs), the 
different equity criteria therefore imply a specific distribution of surplus. In order to assess the 
distributions implied by the egalitarian, sovereignty, polluter-pays, and ability-to-pay rules, 
                                                 
4 In general, the equity rules require the equality of subjects with respect to some measure (see section 2 for the 
application to climate policy).  The following example should further illustrate this idea: assume that $30 have to 
be split among two subjects with initial endowment ($0, $0) and without any other observable differences. Then, 
($15, $15) appears to be the only fair solution. If, however, the initial endowment is ($10, $0), then two “fair” 
solutions of splitting $30 could be suggested: ($15, $15) as before, or ($10, $20). The former would equalize the 
share of the $30, the latter would equalize the end allocation ($20,$20). The self-serving use of equity would 
suggest player 1 to argue with the former and player 2 to use the latter equity argument in the bargaining process. 
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we use information on abatement costs in the respective countries or groups of countries, 
population data, baseline carbon dioxide emissions, and GDP.5 
Our projections for GDP, emissions and populations for 2020 are based on DOE (2005). The 
mapping of the International Energy Outlook regions is described in Table A.1. The GDP, 
CO2 emissions, and populations in the reference case for 1990 and 2002, as well as the projec-
tions for 2020 are summarized in Table A.2. Table A.2 also states an accumulated measure of 
emissions between 1860 and 2002 which are taken from the Climate Analysis Indicators Tool 
(WRI 2005) and updated to 2020 using DOE (2005). Marginal abatement cost curves for 2020 
are generated based on data from the POLES model, which embodies a detailed bottom-up 
description of regional energy markets and world-energy trade (Criqui 2001). Table A.3 
summarizes the abatement cost information for 2020 from POLES. Tables A.2 and A.3 con-
tain all relevant data which we use to calculate allowance allocations, total costs and costs per 
capita for the different global abatement scenarios (permit prices) in 2020.  
The formulas for the allocation of allowances under the different equity rules are implemented 
as follows: for each country or group of countries { }EU, G77/China, Russia, USA∈i , we de-
note for 2020 the business as usual emissions as 2020ie , the GDP as 
2020
iGDP , and the popula-
tion level as 2020iPOP . As we assume that any abatement scenario is implemented at minimal 
costs, i.e. with identical marginal abatement costs, the resulting permit price p  defines the 
optimal allocation of abatement ( )ia p  for each i  with resulting abatement costs ( )iAC p . The 
aggregate levels of all variables are denoted as 2020E , 2020GDP , 2020POP , ( )A p , and ( )AC p , 
respectively. With this we can calculate the permit allocation ( )ie p  which is induced by the 
respective equity criteria. This allocation solves:6 
                                                 
5 Note that we concentrate on the analysis of abatement costs and do not take the benefits from abatement into 
account. By fixing the total abatement level and only considering the different burden allocations, the benefits 
from abatement are kept constant. The cost ranking of the equity criteria which we study is therefore meaningful. 
However, including the benefits from abatement would add new possible equity criteria: for example, the share 
of the costs could be equalized with the share of benefits.  
6 Note that the total burden to a country is given by its abatement costs plus the payments for emission permit in 
excess off its allocation: 2020( ) ( ( ) ( ))i i i iAC p p e a p e p+ − − . 
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  (1) 
Furthermore, we discuss a version of the polluter-pays principle based on the cumulated (his-
torical and future) CO2 emissions between 1860 and 2020. The corresponding formula for 
POL(1860-2020) can be obtained from (1) by replacing the denominators of the POL equation by 
cumulated emissions. 
The resulting economic costs of strictly applying the equity criteria for the respective coun-
tries or groups of countries can be seen in Figures A.1 to A.4. 
Hypotheses on the EU 
Figure A.1 shows clearly that a strict application of the egalitarian principle would be most 
cost intensive for the EU. Given the large amount of emissions between 1860 and 2020 in the 
EU, the polluter-pays principle based on the cumulated CO2 emissions would be also very 
costly for the EU. The EU would prefer the polluter-pays since it has a relative low share in 
global emissions or, secondly, the ability-to-pay principle. The total ranking of the equity 
principles – according to the implied economic costs – for the EU is given as follows:  
(1860-2020)POL ABI SOV POL EGAf f f f      
Hypotheses on G77/China 
We now discuss the costs which are implied by the different equity rules for G77/China. Fig-
ure A.2 indicates these burdens. The ranking of the equity criteria – given by the cost projec-
tions – is as follows: 
(1860-2020)EGA POL SOV ABI POL≈f f f      
It is obvious that G77/China with its large share in global population would profit most from a 
strict application of the egalitarian principle. G77/China would oppose a support of the pol-
luter-pays and ability-to-pay principles. The later principle refers to the predicted high eco-
nomic growth of G77/China until 2020 which would raise the costs associated with the abil-
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ity-to-pay rule. The polluter-pays principle is based on the predicted large increase in emis-
sions from G77/China over the next decades such that the costs of the polluter-pays rule 
would be increased. Developing countries could, however, support POL(1860-2020). 
Hypotheses on Russia 
Figure A.3 indicates that Russia would join the EU in opposing the application of the egalitar-
ian principle. Russia has lowest costs if the sovereignty, or secondly the ability-to-pay crite-
rion is applied. The complete ranking of the equity rules – given by the cost projections – is as 
follows:  
(1860-2020)SOV ABI POL POL EGAf f f f       
When using equity rules according to their implied costs, Russia is therefore predicted to pre-
fer the sovereignty or ability-to-pay principle and to oppose the egalitarian principle. 
 
Hypotheses on the USA 
Figure A.4 finally demonstrates that strictly applying the egalitarian principle would be ex-
tremely cost intensive. The USA are therefore predicted to oppose this criterion. The remain-
ing equity rules do not differ substantially in their associated costs. The total ranking of the 
equity rules – according to the implied economic costs – is given as follows:  
(1860-2020)ABI POL SOV POL EGAf f f f       
It should be noted that the preference for the ability-to-pay principle clearly depends on the 
assumed economic growth of the specific countries in the world. If this criterion were applied 
based on today’s comparisons in GDP, then the burden implied for the USA would be sub-
stantially larger. 
5  Empirical analysis 
In this section, we provide empirical evidence on the strategic use of equity criteria. Our 
analysis is based on data from an international survey on the perception of the negotiation po-
sition of the EU, G77/China, Russia, and the USA.7 
                                                 
7 For the success and the acceptance of international agreements, it is important how the respective negotiation 
positions are perceived by participants in negotiations. We therefore assess the perception of the positions of 
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Description of survey 
Our data stem from a world-wide survey which was carried out with the help of a standard-
ized questionnaire and which was sent in 2004 via e-mail to 1695 agents involved in climate 
policy. The addresses were taken from official UN documents available in the Internet (e.g., 
IPCC workshops). Of the 1695 contacted persons, 230 participated in the survey.8 This is a 
fairly typical participation rate for surveys with individuals which are not interviewed face-to-
face. The participants obtained an individual login and password for the Internet question-
naire. This procedure of sending out passwords allowed us to control the access to the survey 
and, in particular, ensured that each participant could fill out the questionnaire only once. Al-
ternatively, the participants could fill out a Word-document or PDF and send it back via e-
mail or postal mail. 
After explaining the equity rules (see section 2),9 the questionnaire consisted of three parts: 
while the first part addressed the individual views on equity (see Lange et al. 2007), the sec-
ond part elicited the participants’ perceptions of the negotiation positions of each of four ma-
jor players in international climate negotiations: the EU, G77/China, Russia, and the USA. 
This second part is the main basis for our empirical analysis in this paper.  
For each of the equity rules egalitarian, sovereignty, polluter-pays, and ability-to-pay, we first 
asked to which degree the respective countries or groups of countries are expected to support 
incorporating the specified equity rule in international climate agreements. We concentrated 
on a time horizon of no more than 20 years. We differentiated between “a very high degree”, 
“a high degree”, “a moderate degree”, “a low degree”, and “no degree”. Second, we asked 
which of the equity rules is expected to be most important for the respective countries or 
groups of countries. Third, we asked whether the following five reasons are expected to play 
an important role for the respective countries or groups of countries in determining their posi-
tion on the incorporation of this most important equity rule in international climate agree-
ments: material self-interest, fairness considerations of the public, facilitation of international 
                                                                                                                                                        
countries or groups of countries regarding equity instead of looking through the proposals made by the respec-
tive parties (see Reiner and Jacoby 1997). 
8 It should be noted that some of the 230 participants in the survey did not answer all questions such that the 
number of individuals in the empirical analysis is smaller. 
9 As noted before, the questionnaire also addressed personal views on the accompanying principles: the poor 
losers rule and the stand alone criterion (see Lange et al. 2007). Since we did not assess the reasons why coun-
tries might support these accompanying rules, we exclude them from the discussion in this paper.  
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climate negotiations, pressure from industry, pressure from environmental NGOs. Finally, the 
third part of the questionnaire comprised some questions about the individual background 
such as gender, nationality, or participation and role in a Conference of Parties (COP). 
We use the data in order to first establish that countries are seen as incorporating different eq-
uity criteria in international climate negotiations and that the perceived incorporation is highly 
affected by the induced costs (Hypothesis 1). We then turn to the perceived reasons for coun-
tries to support the most important equity rule. The differences in perceptions across our par-
ticipant pool will establish support for versions of self-serving biases (Hypothesis 2).  
5.1 Support of equity rules: Evidence for self-interest 
Descriptive statistics 
Table B.1 reports for the assessment of each country or group of countries the relative fre-
quencies that the respective equity principles should be reflected in the distribution of entitle-
ments for greenhouse gas emissions to “a very high degree” or “a high degree”. Even a first 
look shows noticeable differences in the perceived support of the equity criteria by the respec-
tive countries or groups of countries.  
The position of the EU is largely perceived as being driven by the polluter-pays principle 
(78.2% of all respondents). This coincides with the prominent position which this criterion 
was predicted to have according to the cost projections in the previous section. The relative 
frequencies for the sovereignty and the ability-to-pay rule are rather similar (50.9% vs. 
55.7%), while the support of the egalitarian is smaller (40.1%). Thus, the ranking of perceived 
support of the equity rules is fully consistent with the ranking according to the implied eco-
nomic costs in the previous section.  
G77/China is seen as supporting the incorporation of the egalitarian, the polluter-pays, and the 
ability-to-pay rules to a similar extent (59.5%, 61.0%, 65.5%). The sovereignty notion re-
ceives clearly less support (29.1%). This ranking deviates from the predictions based on our 
cost projections since both the polluter-pays as well as the ability-to-pay rules are seen as re-
ceiving large support although they imply relatively large costs compared to the egalitarian 
principle. This result could only be consistent with economic self-interest of G77/China if the 
polluter-pays principle is based on a cumulated emissions measure (POL(1860-2020)) and/or that 
agents do not take into account the economic changes over the next decades.  
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We now turn to the views on the position of Russia. The expected strong support for the abil-
ity-to-pay criterion (52.8% of the respondents) and the sovereignty notion (54.3% of the re-
spondents) reported in Table B.1 is consistent with the hypothesis of self-interest driven use 
of equity criteria. Overall, the ranking regarding the perceived support of the respective equity 
rules by Russia is in line with the prediction given by our cost projections. 
The USA is primarily seen as supporting the incorporation of the sovereignty principle 
(60.8% of the participants). That is, the USA is assessed as pushing for similar reduction ef-
forts from all countries. In fact, this is consistent with a major official reason for not ratifying 
the Kyoto protocol as the USA demanded meaningful participation of key developing coun-
tries. The polluter-pays principle is seen as getting much less support (41.0%) than the sover-
eignty criterion, also when compared to the EU. This cannot sufficiently be explained with 
self-serving equity notions unless participants interpreted POL as being based on emissions 
cumulated over time. The egalitarian criterion is mostly seen as being rejected by the USA 
(35.7%) which is in line with the cost estimates in the previous section. In contrast, the weak 
perceived support of the ability-to-pay principle (29.8%) is surprising since in the long run 
this criterion would potentially benefit the USA if the predicted economic growth of develop-
ing countries materializes.  
We can summarize these findings as follows: 
Result 1: The importance of incorporating the specific equity rules in international climate 
negotiations is perceived to strongly differ between countries or groups of countries. 
It should be noted that Result 1 is a prerequisite for any self-serving use of equity: since coun-
tries differ in their cost rankings of equity criteria, a self-serving use requires that countries 
support the respective equity rules to a different extent.  
Table B.1 also reports the decomposed relative frequencies separately for respondents from 
the EU and from G77/China which differ for some equity criteria.10 For example, the position 
of G77/China on all equity criteria is assessed differently by respondents from G77/China 
compared with those from other countries.11 This indicates that the characteristics of partici-
                                                 
10 The numbers of participants from Russia and the USA do not allow a meaningful decomposition. 
11 The chi-squared tests in Table B.1 examine whether the distribution of the expected degree of incorporation of 
the respective equity rules (with parameter values “a very high degree”, “a high degree”, “a moderate degree”, “a 
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pants play a major role in the assessment of the use of equity by the respective countries. In-
stead of relying on these descriptive statistics, we therefore perform a detailed econometric 
analysis to study whether the underlying economic costs have a causal effect on the perceived 
incorporation of the specific equity rules or whether the effect of the costs is covered by other 
personal causal factors. 
Description of econometric analysis and variables 
The dependent variable in our econometric analysis is always a dummy which takes the value 
one if the respective country or group of countries is seen as supporting the incorporation 
main equity rules to “a very high degree” or “a high degree”. We therefore consider different 
versions of binary probit models.  
For each country or group of countries, each respondent provided her or his assessment for all 
equity criteria. In order to examine the effect of the specifically assessed equity criteria for a 
country or group of countries, we stack the data over all four equity rules. The corresponding 
dummy variables “Assessment EGA”, “Assessment SOV”, “Assessment POL”, and “Assess-
ment ABI” take the value one if the respective equity rule is assessed and allow us to examine 
the differences in the support of the respective equity criteria.12  
We furthermore include a series of explanatory control variables. First, the personal prefer-
ence for specific equity rules as well as personal views on the general importance of equity in 
international climate negotiations can influence assessments of equity principles for countries. 
We thus include a dummy variable “Personal consistency equity rules” which takes the value 
one if the assessed equity rule comes nearest to the participant‘s personal definition of equity 
in international climate negotiations. In addition, we consider a dummy variable “Equity im-
portance” which takes the value one if the participant stated that equity issues at all are of 
“very high importance” or “high importance”. Both variables are derived from the first part of 
the questionnaire as discussed above (see also Lange et al. 2007).  
Second, the role of participants in international climate negotiations could potentially influ-
ence their perceptions of the use of equity principles by countries. We include an explanatory 
                                                                                                                                                        
low degree”, and “no degree”) differs between the respondents from the EU (or, alternatively, from G77/China) 
and the corresponding respondents from outside the EU (or, alternatively, from outside G77/China). 
12 The basic variable for the equity rules is always the dummy with the smallest relative frequency according to 
Table B.1 for the respective country or group of countries. Therefore, the estimation results confirms the descrip-
tive analysis if all parameters are positively estimated (or at least not significantly negative). 
 -16- 
dummy variable “COP negotiator” which takes the value one if an individual participated in 
COP in the past as a negotiator (and not only an observer of the COP, a member of a delega-
tion, a participating expert, or advising delegations).  
Third, we consider additional individual explanatory control variables: the dummy “NGO” 
takes the value one if the respondent works for a environmental or non-environmental NGO 
and the dummy “Social science” takes the value one if the participant’s highest degree or 
training is in political sciences, economic/business administration, or law. The variable “Age” 
denotes the natural logarithm of the respondent’s age (in years) and the dummy variable 
“Gender” takes the value one if the respondent is female. Furthermore, we account for the na-
tionality of the participant by including a variable on economic performance of the partici-
pant’s country: “GDP per capita” denotes the per capita GDP (in ten thousand $) of the re-
spective country of origin from the Penn World Table (Heston et al., 2002).13 Reflecting the 
findings of Table B.1, we incorporate interaction variables between the assessment of each of 
the four equity rules and provenience EU or G77/China: for example, the dummy variable 
“EU*EGA” takes the value one if a participant from the EU assesses the egalitarian rule.  
 
Results of econometric analysis 
Since each participant provided four assessments per country or group of countries, we esti-
mate random effects (binary) probit models to take into account unobserved heterogeneity.14 
Table B.2 reports the corresponding estimation results for the parameters of the explanatory 
variables.15 The results confirm the descriptive statistics in Table B.1 and therefore Result 1: 
the EU is seen as supporting the incorporation of the polluter-pays rule to a higher degree than 
the egalitarian criterion (1% significance level). G77/China is perceived as supporting the 
ability-to-pay principle more than the sovereignty criterion (1% significance level). Further-
                                                 
13 For each country, we use the last available data point since 1995. Most data stem from 2000. 
14 The random effects correlation coefficients are different from zero at the 5% significance level for the EU and 
the USA, and at the 10% significance level for G77/China. However, traditional binary probit models without 
taking into account the random effects generate qualitatively nearly identical estimation results.  
15 The maximum likelihood estimations (in the same way as all further estimations and also the descriptive statis-
tics discussed above) have been performed with STATA. We always consider robust estimations of the standard 
deviation of the parameter estimates (White, 1982). 
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more, the estimated parameters of “Assessment SOV” for Russia and the USA are larger than 
those of the other assessment dummies.16 
Table B.2 further shows that personal characteristics of the individuals matter. In particular, 
the nationality which is primarily captured by “GDP per capita” is important: the economic 
performance of the participant’s country has a negative effect on the perceived incorporation 
of the equity rules in the EU and Russia (1% significance level) as well as the USA (5% sig-
nificance level). Furthermore, the coefficient of “Personal consistency equity rules” is posi-
tive (1% significance level) for the EU, G77/China, and Russia. That is, a personal equity rule 
preference of the participants also shifts the perception on support of the equity rule by the 
assessed countries. Finally, compared with other participants, negotiators in COPs perceive 
the incorporation of equity rules to be less important for G77/China and more important for 
the USA (5% and 10% significance levels, respectively).  
To check the robustness of these results, we also estimated a multivariate (binary) probit 
model (Greene 2003) which connects the four single equations for each country or group of 
countries. One could argue that the assessments of the different countries and groups of coun-
tries are not mutually independent as implicitly assumed in the separate estimation of the four 
random effects probit models.17 We report the estimation results for the parameters of the ex-
planatory variables in this multivariate probit model in Table B.3.18 They are qualitatively 
very similar to those in Table B.2.  
As a consequence, all former conclusions hold: 
Result 2: The views on how important the incorporation of a specific equity rule is for the 
respective countries or groups of countries depend on personal characteristics such as per-
sonal equity views and the nationality of participants.  
                                                 
16 This main result is extremely robust regarding different model specifications. 
17 The estimation of multivariate probit models with more than two dependent variables requires the inclusion of 
simulators in the maximum likelihood method. This simulated maximum likelihood estimation (incorporating 
the so-called GHK simulator, Geweke et al. 1994, Börsch-Supan and Hajivassiliou 1993; Keane 1994) was re-
cently included in STATA.  
18 The corresponding correlation coefficients are significantly different from zero. The results are based on 50 
random draws in the GHK simulator of the simulated maximum likelihood estimation. We also experimented 
with other numbers of random draws which generate qualitatively identical results.  
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While Result 1 establishes that different countries or groups of countries are seen as support-
ing the equity criteria to a different degree, Result 2 shows that personal characteristics matter 
for forming these perceptions.  
The econometric analysis so far did, however, not explicitly account for the economic costs 
associated with the four different equity rules. In order to provide deeper insights into the hy-
pothesis that countries support equity criteria to serve material self-interest, we introduce the 
variables “Costs equity rules EU”, “Costs equity rules G77/China”, “Costs equity rules Rus-
sia”, and “Costs equity rules USA”. They measure the costs (in % of the GDP) which would 
be implied by the respective main equity criterion for the assessed country or group of coun-
tries when the marginal abatement costs in 2020 are equalized at a reasonable 80 
USD2000/tC, i.e. approximately 22 USD2000/tCO2 (see Table A.4 and Figures A.1-A.4). 
These variables are incorporated as main explanatory factors and substitute the assessment 
variables as discussed above according to Table B.2 and B.3.  
Table B.4 reports the estimation results for the parameters of the explanatory variables in the 
random effects probit models. The corresponding results in the multivariate probit model are 
stated in Table B.5. The parameter estimations in both methodological approaches are qualita-
tively almost identical.19 Tables B.4 and B.5 show that the costs which are implied by the re-
spective main equity criterion have a strongly negative effect on the perceived support of the 
equity rules by the EU, Russia, and the USA (at least at the 5% significance level). For the 
assessment of G77/China, the impact is not significant (even when the corresponding parame-
ter estimate is negative).  
These findings therefore give strong support for the hypothesis that economic costs are a ma-
jor determinant of the (relative) use of equity criteria by the respective countries:  
Result 3: Consistent with a self-serving use of equity criteria, the economic costs implied by 
the respective equity rules explain their perceived support by the EU, Russia, and the USA. In 
contrast, the link between the perceived position of G77/China and the underlying costs can-
not be established based on the data. 
  
                                                 
19 The finding is robust across various specifications regarding the inclusion of explanatory control variables, 
different numbers of random draws in the GHK simulator of the simulated maximum likelihood estimation of 
the multivariate probit models, as well as the estimation in traditional univariate probit or ordered probit models.  
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5.2  Reasons for supporting equity rules: Evidence for self-serving bias 
Result 3 establishes that the perceived positions of countries or groups of countries are largely 
consistent with material self-interest: the support of an equity rule by a region is weaker, the 
larger the costs are which the equity criterion implies. As discussed in section 3, this finding 
is consistent with both, an unconscious self-serving bias or a conscious self-serving use of eq-
uity. It is therefore interesting to see whether the equity position of the respective countries is 
identified as self-serving by the participants in our survey.  
Descriptive statistics 
We study different reasons which could influence the position of a country or group of coun-
tries: material self-interest, fairness considerations of the public, facilitation of international 
climate negotiations, pressure from industry, and pressure from environmental NGOs. Table 
B.6 reports the relative frequencies that the respective reasons are perceived as playing an im-
portant role in determining the position of a country or group of countries on its most impor-
tant equity rule.  
The expected main driving force for using the most important equity rule by Russia, by the 
USA, as well as by G77/China is material self-interest (88.9%, 93.5%, and 86.1% of all re-
spondents). Regarding G77/China, this result shows that even though we could not establish 
cost considerations as a main driving force behind equity use in the previous section, 
G77/China is seen as using the criteria out of material self-interest. In contrast, the position of 
the EU is seen to be motivated by material self interest to a lesser extent (62.7%) although the 
relative support of equity criteria by the EU fully corresponds to the cost ranking.  
For the USA and Russia, pressure from industry is perceived as playing an important role for 
the incorporation of the most important equity rule (83.9% and 69.7% of all respondents). For 
the EU, 87.9% of all participants expect that fairness considerations of the public and 78.9% 
expect that pressure from environmental NGOs play an important role. Corresponding to the 
perception of the EU as a primary driving player in international climate negotiations, the rea-
son of its use of the most important equity rule is seen as facilitation of international climate 
negotiations (83.1% of the respondents).  
We summarize these findings as follows: 
Result 4: Countries or groups of countries are perceived to strongly differ in the reasons 
which determine their positions on the incorporation of the most important equity rule. Im-
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portantly, G77/China, Russia, and the USA are seen as using this equity principle primarily 
out of material self-interest.  
First evidence for the self-serving bias hypothesis is obtained from decomposing the relative 
frequencies for respondents from the EU and from G77/China.20 According to Table B.6, 
75.3% of the participants from G77/China state that material self-interest plays an important 
role for the use of the most important equity criteria by G77/China, while 96.8% of the par-
ticipants from the EU perceive material self-interest playing an important role in the position 
of G77/China.21 The corresponding EU position is seen by 51.9% of the participants from the 
EU as material self-interest driven while 70.8% of the participants from G77/China see the 
EU as using self-serving equity arguments. These results are preliminary since only descrip-
tive statistics are considered. We therefore again perform an econometric analysis to consider 
the determinants of participants’ stating that the several reasons play an important role in sup-
porting the most important equity rule. 
Description of econometric analysis and variables 
The dependent variables are dummies which take the value one if the agent states that the re-
spective reason plays an important role for the position of the assessed country. We therefore 
consider again different versions of binary probit models.  
Each respondent provided her or his assessment for all countries or groups of countries and 
for all the different reasons which might play an important role for the support of the most 
important equity rule. In order to examine the effect of the assessed country or group of coun-
try on the importance of a specific reason, we stack the data over all four countries and groups 
of countries. We include the corresponding dummy variables in the econometric analysis as 
control factors: “Assessment EU”, “Assessment G77/China”, “Assessment Russia”, and “As-
sessment USA” take the value one if the respective countries are assessed.22  
                                                 
20 As discussed above, the numbers of participants from Russia and the USA are too small for a meaningful de-
composition for these two countries. 
21 The corresponding chi-squared tests also show that the relative frequencies for the respondents from the EU 
(or, alternatively, from G77/China) significantly differ from the relative frequencies for the respondents from 
outside the EU (or, alternatively, from outside G77/China). 
22 In the different estimations, we define the basic variable as the dummy with the smallest relative frequency 
according to Table B.6. As a consequence, the estimation results would coincide with the descriptive analysis if 
all corresponding parameters were positively estimated (or at least not significantly negative). 
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In assessing the importance of the respective reasons, it should be noted that the respondents 
consider the equity principle which they identified as being most important for the respective 
country or group of countries. As a consequence, the assessment might be distorted: assume 
that regions are seen as favoring different equity criteria and our participants perceive the use 
of a specific equity rule as, e.g., more self-interested than other equity rules. In order to ac-
count for these assessed different equity criteria, we include the dummy variables “EGA most 
important”, “SOV most important”, and “POL most important” which take the value one if the 
respective equity rules are expected to be most important for the assessed country and group 
of countries.23  
We test different versions of the self-serving bias hypothesis: while experimental evidence 
indicates that agents might see their own position as less self-interested, our survey addresses 
the assessment of countries’ positions. We therefore hypothesize that the view on the policy 
of the own region might be more favorable than the view on other countries. Similarly, par-
ticipants might be positively biased in their assessment of a region which is supporting an eq-
uity criterion which the participant personally prefers.  
In order to test these versions of the self-serving bias hypothesis, we include the variables 
“Own region” and “Personal consistency equity rules”. “Own region” takes the value one if a 
respondent assesses his or her own country or group of countries. “Personal consistency eq-
uity rules” takes the value one if a specific equity rule is expected to be most important for a 
country or group of countries and – simultaneously – this equity rule comes nearest to the par-
ticipant’s personal definition of equity. For both variables we can expect negative coefficients 
for reasons with negative attributes (material self-interest and pressure from industry) and 
positive parameter signs are expected for reasons with positive attributes (fairness considera-
tions of the public, facilitation of international climate negotiations, and – to a smaller extent 
– pressure from environmental NGOs). 
Finally, in a slightly different version of a self-serving bias, it could be possible that individu-
als who are responsible for decisions are less likely to state that their decisions are influenced 
by lobby groups (industry as well as environmental NGOs). To investigate this version of a 
self-serving bias, we include the variable “COP negotiator” which is defined as in section 5.1.  
                                                 
23 The dummy for the ability-to-pay principle is used as basic variable. 
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Additionally, we again include personal characteristics (“Equity importance”, “NGO”, “Social 
science”, “Age”, “Gender”, and “GDP per capita”) as explanatory control variables.  
Econometric results 
We consider random effects probit models which address the respective reasons separately.24 
In order to test the robustness of the estimation results, we additionally estimate a multivariate 
probit model which connects the five single equations.25 The corresponding estimation results 
for the parameters of the explanatory variables are reported in Tables B.7 and B.8. It should 
be noted that some parameter estimations in the random effects and multivariate probit mod-
els differ in their significance.26  
The results first confirm the descriptive statistics in Table B.6 and therefore Result 4:27 com-
pared to the EU, the other countries or groups of countries are seen as supporting the most 
important equity rule more out of material self-interest (1% significance level). Fairness con-
siderations of the public and facilitation of international climate negotiations are expected to 
play a more important role for the EU (1% significance level). In the same way, the facilita-
tion reason is expected to play a more important role for Russia than for the USA (at least at 
the 5% significance level). Furthermore, the USA are assessed as supporting the most impor-
tant equity rule more due to pressure from industry than other countries (at least 5% signifi-
cance level). 
Tables B.7 and B.8 further show that the perception of why a country or group of country 
chooses its equity position depends on the identity of its most important equity rule: the pa-
rameter of “POL most important” is negative for the material self-interest reason (at least at 
the 5% significance level). The coefficients of “SOV most important” and “EGA most impor-
                                                 
24 The random effects correlation coefficients are always different from zero at the 1% significance level. How-
ever, the corresponding estimations in binary probit models without unobserved heterogeneity lead to qualita-
tively nearly identical results and are available on request. 
25 The correlation coefficients are different from zero at least at the 10% significance level. The results are based 
on 50 random draws in the GHK simulator of the simulated maximum likelihood estimation. However, the esti-
mations are robust with other numbers of random draws.  
26 It should be noted that the reliability of the estimation results in this multivariate probit model might be lim-
ited: while the number n of observations is lower than in the separate random effect probit models, the simulated 
maximum likelihood estimation in multivariate probit models generally needs large numbers of observations to 
provide robust estimation results due to the additional estimation of variance covariance parameters. 
27 While we want to concentrate on the potential self-serving bias, it should be noted that personal characteristics 
again have significant effects. For example, social scientists assess the support of the most important equity rule 
out of material self-interest more than other participants (at least at the 5% significance level). Furthermore, the 
economic performance of participant’s countries (measured by “GDP per capita”) influences their assessment. 
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tant” are positive for the importance of pressure from industry and of pressure from environ-
mental NGOs, respectively (5% and 10% significance level, respectively).  
We summarize these findings as follows: 
Result 5: Material self-interest is perceived as less important for determining the position of 
countries on their most important equity rule if this coincides with the polluter-pays principle. 
If a country or group of countries is perceived as primarily supporting the sovereignty rule, 
pressure from industry is seen as more important for forming this equity position. If the egali-
tarian criterion is perceived as most important equity criterion for a country or group of 
countries, pressure from environmental NGOs is more likely to be seen as an important rea-
son for determining this position. 
Result 5 thereby points to important differences in the perception of equity rules: supporting 
the polluter-pays criterion is seen as less materially self-interested while the sovereignty is 
perceived as being pushed by industry groups. The latter corresponds to concerns that without 
similar reduction obligations across regions, countries with stricter abatement targets might 
experience a loss in competiveness of their industries. 
We finally discuss the estimation results for the main variables which correspond to different 
versions of the self-serving bias hypothesis: “Own region”, “Personal consistency equity 
rules”, and “COP negotiator”.  
In Table B.7, parameters of “Own region” are different from zero with signs consistent with 
the self-serving bias hypothesis for the reasons material self-interest, fairness considerations 
of the public, and facilitation of international climate negotiations (5% significance level). It 
must be noted that the support for this self-serving bias hypothesis is weak since these effects 
become insignificant in the multivariate probit model (Table B.8). 
The estimation results for “Personal consistency equity rules” provide more robust insights: 
the coefficients are positive for the importance of the facilitation of international climate ne-
gotiations (at least at the 5% significance level) and the pressure from environmental NGOs 
(at least at the 10% significance level). Furthermore, the parameters are negative for the im-
portance of the pressure from industry (at least at the 10% significance level).  
Finally negotiators in COPs are less likely to state pressure from interest groups as an impor-
tant reason. The corresponding coefficient for pressure from industry is negative (at least at 
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the 5% significance level). Furthermore, the coefficient for pressure from environmental 
NGOs is negative in the multivariate probit (5% significance level). 
In combination, these findings provide evidence for different versions of the self-serving bias 
and can be summarized as follows: 
Result 6: Differences in expectations of participants on the reasons of countries’ positions on 
equity criteria are consistent with different versions of self-serving biases: there exists evi-
dence that agents are more (less) likely to state that some reasons with positive (negative) at-
tributes are of importance if they assess a country or group of countries which supports the 
equity rule which they prefer themselves and – less robust – if they assess their own region. 
Negotiators in COP are less likely to see the negotiation position of countries as driven by 
interest groups.  
Result 6 puts an interesting twist to ideas of self-serving biases which have been stated in the 
literature (see section 3). The literature usually considers a (unconsciously or consciously) 
biased view on the fairness of one’s own use individual decisions. This most closely corre-
sponds to a more favorable view on the own country for which we find weak evidence. In ad-
dition, however, participants are also more likely to state favorable reasons for other countries 
that support the equity principle which the individual prefers. This is consistent with a modi-
fied self-serving idea: if a person is more likely to label her own preferred action as fair or 
less self-interested, the person should also be more likely to put these labels on other persons 
(here, countries) who choose the same action. Similarly, negotiators might be less inclined to 
state that the negotiations are influenced by interest groups if they want to see their actions as 
being welfare-oriented and impartial.  
6 Conclusions 
In this paper we put forward equity as an important structural element to understanding nego-
tiation outcomes using the example of international climate negotiations. Taking a traditional 
economic standpoint, we argued that the use of equity criteria could be driven by cost consid-
eration of the parties. Our data from an international survey largely confirmed our predictions 
based on a cost-ranking of the respective equity criteria for the different countries or groups of 
countries: the perceived support of equity criteria is the stronger the less costly this criterion is 
compared to alternatives.  
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Our study shed interesting light on the self-serving use of equity arguments in international 
negotiations. While previous experimental studies have considered the self-serving use of 
fairness or equity criteria in individual decision-making environments, our study lent support 
to a generalized notion of self-serving biases: even subjects which do not negotiate them-
selves, considered the use of their personally preferred equity criterion by negotiating parties 
as less self-interested. Furthermore, negotiators themselves stated that countries use of equity 
is less due to pressure from interest groups. We are not aware of any other empirical study 
which considers this self-serving use of equity in non-individualistic bargaining situations. 
While the findings in this study indicate that equity notions in international negotiations are 
mostly correlated with the self-interest of the negotiating parties, the question remains how 
exactly their use influences the negotiation process. We believe that this potentially strategic 
role of using equity criteria will be essential in generating a better understanding of negotia-
tion processes – not only on international climate policy.  
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Appendix A – Abatement costs and predictions 
Table A.1: International Energy Outlook regions and mapping to survey countries or 
groups of countries 
International Energy Outlook regions  Survey countries or groups of countries 
United States of America USA 
Other North America ROW 
Western Europe EU 
Mature market Asia ROW 
Russia Russia 
Other former Soviet Union ROW  
Eastern Europe EU 
Emerging Asia G77/China 
Middle East G77/China 
Africa G77/China 
Central and south America G77/China 
Source: DOE (2005) 
 
Table A.2: GDP, population, and carbon emissions for survey countries or groups of coun-
tries  
 Year EU G77/China Russia USA ROW World
GDP 1990 8160 9871 2241 7113 5688 33073 
(Billion USD2000) 2002 10484 18449 1657 10075 6562 47227 
 2020 15816 46555 3571 17634 11006 94582 
Population 1990 498 3965 148 253 396 5260 
(Million) 2002 513 4891 144 289 429 6266 
 2020 514 6092 129 337 460 7532 
Emissions 1990 1229 1664 640 1361 959 5853 
(MtC) 2002 1166 2566 415 1568 942 6658 
 2020 1299 4767 538 2035 1186 9825 
Accumulated Emissions 
(GtC) 
1860-
2020 
98 115 32 117 75 438 
Source: Own calculations based on DOE (2005) and WRI (2005) 
   
Table A.3: Summary of abatement cost assumptions in 2020 
 
Marginal Abatement Costs (USD2000/tC)   
  40 80 120 160 200 40 80 120 160 200 
Countries 
(groups of 
countries) 
Abatement (MtC) 
 
Total abatement costs  
(Bn USD2000) 
EU 72 128 175 216 250 1.4 4.7 9.4 15.0 21.2 
G77/China 502 860 1137 1365 1558 9.5 30.7 58.2 89.9 124.7 
Russia 63 109 142 167 190 1.2 3.9 7.1 10.7 14.7 
USA 155 270 362 437 502 2.9 9.8 18.9 29.4 41.0 
ROW 64 112 151 181 209 1.2 4.0 7.9 12.1 17.0 
WORLD 856 1480 1967 2366 2709 16.2 53.1 101.5 157.2 218.7 
Source: Own calculations based on POLES (Criqui 2001) 
 
Table A.4: Costs in 2020 implied by the respective equity criteria for the respective coun-
tries (in % of GDP) when marginal abatement costs are equalized at USD2000/tC=80 
 
 EU G77/China RUS USA 
EGA 0.3340 -0.4226 0.7494 0.6866 
SOV 0.0640 0.0415 0.0467 0.0719 
ABI 0.0562 0.0562 0.0562 0.0562 
POL 0.0444 0.0554 0.0814 0.0624 
 
 
   
Figure A.1: Costs in 2020 implied by the respective equity criteria for the EU (in % of 
GDP)  
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Figure A.2: Costs in 2020 implied by the respective equity criteria for G77/China (in % of 
GDP). 
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Figure A.3: Costs in 2020 implied by the respective equity criteria for Russia (in % of 
GDP). 
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Figure A.4: Costs in 2020 implied by the respective equity criteria for the USA (in % of 
GDP). 
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Appendix B – Empirical results 
Table B.1: Relative frequencies that the respective main equity rules should be reflected in 
the distribution of entitlements for greenhouse gas emissions to “a very high degree” or “a 
high degree” 
 Assessment of 
EGA 
Assessment of 
SOV 
Assessment of 
POL 
Assessment of 
ABI 
Expected position of the EU 
All respondents 40.1%           
(n=167) 
50.9%           
(n=167) 
78.2%           
(n=174) 
55.7%          
(n=174) 
Respondents from the EU 36.5%***      
(n=63) 
42.9%          
(n=63) 
79.1%         
(n=67) 
54.5%**               
(n=66)  
Respondents from G77/China 46.0%**             
(n=74) 
50.7%          
(n=73) 
76.6%           
(n=77) 
60.3%**        
(n=78) 
Expected position of G77/China 
All respondents 59.5%           (n=173) 
29.1%          
(n=172) 
61.0%           
(n=177) 
65.5%         
(n=174) 
Respondents from the EU 61.9%          (n=63) 
17.2%***       
(n=64) 
61.2%**         
(n=67) 
75.4%**           
(n=65) 
Respondents from G77/China 50.6%
**           
(n=79) 
34.6%***      
(n=78) 
62.0%***      
(n=79) 
55.1%***      
(n=78) 
Expected position of Russia 
All respondents 31.4%          (n=159) 
54.3%           
(n=162) 
42.7%       
(n=164) 
52.8%          
(n=163) 
Respondents from the EU 19.7%
**          
(n=61) 
54.8%          
(n=62) 
29.5%*          
(n=61) 
57.4%          
(n=61) 
Respondents from G77/China 42.0%
***      
(n=69) 
46.4%          
(n=69) 
54.2%*           
(n=72) 
47.9%          
(n=71) 
Expected position of the USA 
All respondents 35.7%          (n=171) 
60.8%          
(n=171) 
41.0%           
(n=173) 
29.8%        
(n=171)  
Respondents from the EU 26.6%
*             
(n=64) 
58.7%          
(n=63) 
29.2%**           
(n=65) 
17.5%**          
(n=63) 
Respondents from G77/China 49.3%
**         
(n=75) 
60.5%          
(n=76) 
47.4%              
(n=76) 
39.5%*              
(n=76) 
Notes: *** (**, *) denotes that the distribution of the expected degree of incorporation of the respective equity 
rules (with parameter values “a very high degree”, “a high degree”, “a moderate degree”, “a low degree”, 
and “no degree”, irrespective of the relative frequencies) differs between the respondents from the EU (or, 
alternatively, from G77/China) and the corresponding respondents from outside the EU (or, alternatively, from 
outside G77/China) at the 1% (5%, 10%) level of significance according to the appropriate chi-squared test. n 
= number of observations  
 
Corresponding ranking regarding the expected incorporation of the equity rules: 
EU:   POLf  ABI f  SOV f  EGA 
G77/China:  ABI f  POL f  EGA f  SOV  
Russia:  SOV f  ABI f  POLf  EGA 
USA:   SOV f  POL f  EGA f  ABI  
   
Table B.2: Maximum likelihood estimates (z-statistics) in random effects probit models, de-
terminants of the expected position of countries and groups of countries that the main equity 
rules should be reflected in the distribution of entitlements for greenhouse gas emissions to 
“a very high degree” or “a high degree” 
 
Explanatory variables 
(1) 
Expected 
position of 
the EU  
(2) 
Expected 
position of 
G77/China  
(3) 
Expected 
position of 
Russia  
(4) 
Expected 
position of 
the USA  
Assessment EGA --              
(--) 
1.05**           
(2.50) 
--              
(--) 
-0.54           
(-1.20) 
Assessment SOV 1.28***         
(2.95) 
--              
(--)  
1.77***          
(3.67) 
0.92**           
(2.25) 
Assessment POL 1.49***         
(3.16) 
0.44            
(1.08) 
0.83*           
(1.74) 
0.63            
(1.52) 
Assessment ABI 0.80*           
(1.85) 
1.26***          
(2.97) 
1.38***          
(2.91) 
--              
(--) 
Personal consistency equity rules 0.78***         
(4.61) 
0.81***         
(5.00) 
0.46***          
(2.91) 
0.15            
(0.98) 
Equity importance 0.10            
(0.55) 
-0.04           
(-0.23) 
0.30*           
(1.80) 
0.30*          
(1.68) 
COP negotiator 0.07            
(0.33) 
-0.39**          
(-2.06) 
-0.08           
(-0.42) 
0.38*           
(1.89) 
NGO -0.07           
(-0.23) 
0.49            
(1.59) 
-0.14           
(-0.51) 
-0.09           
(-0.28) 
Social science -0.12           
(-0.56) 
0.15            
(0.75) 
-0.08           
(-0.43) 
-0.23           
(-1.09) 
Age -0.18          
(-0.50) 
0.42            
(1.32) 
-0.27           
(-0.83) 
-0.01           
(-0.04) 
Gender -0.00           
(-0.01) 
0.53***         
(2.89) 
0.31*           
(1.75) 
-0.03           
(-0.17) 
EU * assessment EGA 0.22            
(0.56) 
-0.40           
(-1.06) 
0.39            
(0.91) 
0.57            
(1.37) 
EU * assessment SOV -0.44           
(-1.20) 
-0.60           
(-1.56) 
-0.36           
(-1.01) 
0.05            
(0.14) 
EU* assessment POL 0.08            
(0.20) 
0.13            
(0.36) 
-0.31           
(-0.84) 
-0.50          
(-1.38) 
EU * assessment ABI 0.22            
(0.59) 
-0.30           
(-0.80) 
-0.05           
(-0.13) 
-0.49           
(-1.23) 
G77/China * assessment EGA -0.09           
(-0.21) 
-0.68*          
(-1.66) 
0.07            
(0.15) 
0.46            
(1.04) 
G77/China * assessment SOV -1.21***         
(-2.82) 
-0.23           
(-0.57) 
-1.60***         
(-3.73) 
-0.57           
(-1.39) 
G77/China * assessment POL -0.51           
(-1.05) 
-0.12           
(-0.31) 
-0.49           
(-1.16) 
-0.66           
(-1.59) 
G77/China * assessment ABI -0.25           
(-0.60) 
-0.83**          
(-1.99) 
-1.11***         
(-2.69) 
-0.25           
(-0.62) 
GDP per capita -0.32***         
(-2.69) 
-0.05           
(-0.46) 
-0.41***         
(-3.76) 
-0.28**          
(-2.51) 
Constant 0.38            
(0.27) 
-2.08           
(-1.61) 
0.44            
(0.34) 
-0.20           
(-0.15) 
 
Notes: *** (**, *) means that the appropriate parameter is different from zero at the 1% (5%, 10%) signifi-
cance level. Number of observations n=482 (127 individuals) in (1), n=495 (129 individuals) in (2), n=460 
(120 individuals) in (3), n=485 (125 individuals) in (4). 
   
Table B.3: Simulated maximum likelihood estimates (simulated z-statistics) in a multivari-
ate (binary) probit model (50 random draws in the GHK simulator), determinants of the ex-
pected position of countries and groups of countries that the main equity rules should be re-
flected in the distribution of entitlements for greenhouse gas emissions to “a very high de-
gree” or “a high degree”, number n of observations = 439 
 
 
Explanatory variables 
(1) 
Expected 
position of 
the EU 
(2) 
Expected 
position of 
G77/China  
(3)  
Expected 
position of   
Russia  
(4) 
Expected 
position of 
the USA  
Assessment EGA --              
(--) 
0.85*           
(1.84) 
--              
(--) 
-0.39           
(-0.87) 
Assessment SOV 1.08**          
(2.43) 
--              
(--)  
1.65***          
(3.70) 
0.92**           
(2.08) 
Assessment POL 1.16**           
(2.49) 
0.58            
(1.30) 
0.75*           
(1.74) 
0.50            
(1.19) 
Assessment ABI 0.48            
(1.07) 
1.54***          
(3.17) 
1.30***          
(2.93) 
--              
(--) 
Personal consistency equity rules 0.73***         
(4.50) 
0.72***         
(4.35) 
0.40**           
(2.50) 
0.14            
(0.87) 
Equity importance -0.03           
(-0.20) 
0.05            
(0.33) 
0.29**           
(2.08) 
0.24*           
(1.68) 
COP negotiator 0.04            
(0.24) 
-0.44**          
(-2.53) 
-0.06           
(-0.38) 
0.28*           
(1.77) 
NGO 0.02           
(0.07) 
0.42*           
(1.78) 
-0.06           
(-0.25) 
-0.02           
(-0.06) 
Social science -0.19           
(-1.03) 
0.10            
(0.57) 
0.09            
(0.57) 
-0.20           
(-1.10) 
Age -0.20           
(-0.66) 
0.30            
(0.96) 
-0.09           
(-0.30) 
-0.08           
(-0.27) 
Gender 0.02            
(0.11) 
0.49***         
(2.83) 
0.37**           
(2.32) 
0.10            
(0.62) 
EU * assessment EGA 0.10            
(0.27) 
-0.17           
(-0.42) 
0.26            
(0.69) 
0.37            
(0.94) 
EU * assessment SOV -0.52           
(-1.49) 
-0.51           
(-1.35) 
-0.32           
(-0.90) 
0.02            
(0.06) 
EU* assessment POL 0.10            
(0.24) 
-0.07           
(-0.19) 
-0.34           
(-0.94) 
-0.40           
(-1.16) 
EU * assessment ABI 0.21            
(0.56) 
-0.72*          
(-1.69) 
-0.21           
(-0.56) 
-0.46           
(-1.20) 
G77/China * assessment EGA -0.26           
(-0.62) 
-0.46           
(-1.06) 
0.01            
(0.03) 
0.40            
(0.98) 
G77/China * assessment SOV -1.17***         
(-2.89) 
-0.24           
(-0.58) 
-1.53***         
(-3.63) 
-0.65           
(-1.57) 
G77/China * assessment POL -0.44           
(-0.94) 
-0.14           
(-0.32) 
-0.45           
(-1.15) 
-0.41           
(-1.07) 
G77/China * assessment ABI -0.16          
(-0.41) 
-1.04**         
(-2.20) 
-1.11***         
(-2.74) 
-0.15           
(-0.36) 
GDP per capita -0.30***         
(-2.75) 
-0.03           
(-0.27) 
-0.37***         
(-3.45) 
-0.26**          
(-2.49) 
Constant 0.75            
(0.62) 
-1.65          
(-1.28) 
-0.24           
(-0.20) 
0.04            
(0.03) 
 
Note: *** (**, *) means that the appropriate parameter is different from zero at the 1% (5%, 10%) signifi-
cance level..  
   
Table B.4: Maximum likelihood estimates (z-statistics) in random effects probit models, de-
terminants of the expected position of countries and groups of countries that the main equity 
rules should be reflected in the distribution of entitlements for greenhouse gas emissions to 
“a very high degree” or “a high degree 
 
 
Explanatory variables 
(1) 
Expected 
position of 
the EU  
(2) 
Expected 
position of 
G77/China 
(3) 
Expected 
position of 
Russia  
(4) 
Expected 
position of 
the USA  
Costs equity rules EU -4.21***         
(-3.21) 
--              
(--) 
--              
(--) 
--              
(--) 
Costs equity rules G77/China --              
(--) 
-0.99           
(-1.37) 
--              
(--) 
--              
(--) 
Costs equity rules Russia --              
(--) 
--             
(--) 
-1.98***         
(-3.30) 
--              
(--) 
Costs equity rules USA --              
(--) 
--              
(--) 
--              
(--) 
-1.67***         
(-2.77) 
Personal consistency equity rules 0.79***          
(4.73) 
0.78***         
(4.95) 
0.42***          
(2.74) 
0.16           
(1.07) 
Equity importance 0.10           
(0.56) 
-0.03           
(-0.19) 
0.29*           
(1.79) 
0.30*           
(1.66) 
COP negotiator 0.07           
(0.35) 
-0.39**          
(-2.11) 
-0.08           
(-0.42) 
0.37*           
(1.88) 
NGO -0.08          
(-0.24) 
0.47           
(1.58) 
-0.15           
(-0.52) 
-0.10           
(-0.31) 
Social science -0.12           
(-0.54) 
0.16           
(0.83) 
-0.08           
(-0.41) 
-0.22           
(-1.07) 
Age -0.18           
(-0.50) 
0.43           
(1.38) 
-0.26           
(-0.83) 
-0.01           
(-0.04) 
Gender -0.01           
(-0.03) 
0.53***         
(2.92) 
0.31*           
(1.74) 
-0.04           
(-0.19) 
EU * assessment EGA 0.23           
(0.57) 
-0.38           
(-1.03) 
0.42           
(0.96) 
0.54           
(1.32) 
EU * assessment SOV -0.29           
(-1.03) 
-1.16***        
(-3.97) 
0.03           
(0.10) 
0.45*           
(1.65) 
EU* assessment POL 0.36           
(1.17) 
0.01           
(0.04) 
-0.78***         
(-2.86) 
-0.40           
(-1.45) 
EU * assessment ABI -0.15           
(-0.51) 
0.39           
(1.43) 
-0.02           
(-0.08) 
-1.03***         
(-3.29) 
G77/China * assessment EGA -0.07          
(-0.17) 
-0.66           
(-1.62) 
0.09           
(0.21) 
0.46           
(1.05) 
G77/China * assessment SOV -1.05***        
(-2.95) 
-0.79**         
(-2.44) 
-1.20***         
(-3.45) 
-0.14           
(-0.42) 
G77/China * assessment POL -0.22           
(-0.59) 
-0.23           
(-0.70) 
-0.94 ***         
(-2.74) 
-0.54           
(-1.59) 
G77/China * assessment ABI -0.60*          
(-1.70) 
-0.12          
(-0.37) 
-1.08***         
(-3.15) 
-0.77**          
(-2.28) 
GDP per capita -0.31***        
(-2.65) 
-0.04           
(-0.43) 
-0.40***         
(-3.76) 
-0.27**          
(-2.46) 
Constant 1.76           
(1.24) 
-1.51          
(-1.22) 
1.89           
(1.49) 
0.41           
(0.31) 
 
Notes: *** (**, *) means that the appropriate parameter is different from zero at the 1% (5%, 10%) signifi-
cance level. Number of observations n=482 (127 individuals) in (1), n=495 (129 individuals) in (2), n=460 
(120 individuals) in (3), n=485 (125 individuals) in (4). 
   
Table B.5: Simulated maximum likelihood estimates (simulated z-statistics) in a multivari-
ate (binary) probit model (50 random draws in the GHK simulator), determinants of the ex-
pected position of countries and groups of countries that the main equity rules should be re-
flected in the distribution of entitlements for greenhouse gas emissions to “a very high de-
gree” or “a high degree”, number n of observations = 439 
 
 
Explanatory variables 
(1) 
Expected 
position of 
the EU 
(2) 
Expected 
position of 
G77/China  
(3) 
Expected 
position of 
Russia  
(4) 
Expected 
position of 
the USA  
Costs equity rules EU -3.30**          
(-2.49) 
--              
(--) 
--              
(--) 
--              
(--) 
Costs equity rules G77/China --              
(--) 
-0.34           
(-0.42) 
--              
(--) 
--              
(--) 
Costs equity rules Russia --              
(--) 
--              
(--) 
-1.89***         
(-3.57) 
--              
(--) 
Costs equity rules USA --              
(--) 
--              
(--) 
--              
(--) 
-1.41**          
(-2.42) 
Personal consistency equity rules 0.75***         
(4.67) 
0.71***         
(4.31) 
0.37**          
(2.32) 
0.14           
(0.90) 
Equity importance -0.03           
(-0.20) 
0.06           
(0.39) 
0.29**          
(2.05) 
0.24           
(1.64) 
COP negotiator 0.04           
(0.25) 
-0.43**          
(-2.47) 
-0.06           
(-0.39) 
0.28*           
(1.74) 
NGO 0.01          
(0.05) 
0.40*           
(1.66) 
-0.06           
(-0.25) 
-0.02           
(-0.08) 
Social science -0.19           
(-1.04) 
0.09           
(0.52) 
0.09           
(0.57) 
-0.20           
(-1.13) 
Age -0.20           
(-0.67) 
0.28           
(0.91) 
-0.09           
(-0.33) 
-0.09           
(-0.32) 
Gender 0.02           
(0.10) 
0.49***         
(2.85) 
0.37**          
(2.30) 
0.10           
(0.62) 
EU * assessment EGA 0.13           
(0.33) 
-0.12           
(-0.31) 
0.30           
(0.78) 
0.37           
(0.96) 
EU * assessment SOV -0.30           
(-1.22) 
-1.16***         
(-4.17) 
0.04           
(0.16) 
0.47*           
(1.90) 
EU* assessment POL 0.33           
(1.18) 
-0.13           
(-0.49) 
-0.80***         
(-2.96) 
-0.37           
(-1.39) 
EU * assessment ABI -0.21          
(-0.79) 
0.19           
(0.67) 
-0.17           
(-0.67) 
-0.95***         
(-3.41) 
G77/China * assessment EGA -0.22           
(-0.53) 
-0.42           
(-0.98) 
0.05           
(0.12) 
0.41           
(1.02) 
G77/China * assessment SOV -0.94***        
(-2.92) 
-0.89***         
(-2.70) 
-1.17***         
(-3.68) 
-0.19           
(-0.62) 
G77/China * assessment POL -0.20           
(-0.57) 
-0.20           
(-0.59) 
-0.91***         
(-2.79) 
-0.38           
(-1.15) 
G77/China * assessment ABI -0.56*          
(-1.72) 
-0.15          
(-0.46) 
-1.07***         
(-3.47) 
-0.63**          
(-2.02) 
GDP per capita -0.29***        
(-2.79) 
-0.03           
(-0.29) 
-0.37***         
(-3.49) 
-0.25**          
(-2.47) 
Constant 1.82           
(1.52) 
-0.92           
(-0.74) 
1.17           
(1.04) 
0.65         
(0.56) 
 
Note: *** (**, *) means that the appropriate parameter is different from zero at the 1% (5%, 10%) signifi-
cance level.. 
   
Table B.6: Relative frequencies that some reasons play an important role for countries and 
groups of countries for the incorporation of the most important equity rule in international 
climate negotiations  
 
 Assessment 
of the EU  
Assessment 
of 77/China  
Assessment 
of Russia 
Assessment 
of the USA 
Reason: Material self interest 
All respondents 62.7%      
(n=153) 
86.1%          
(n=166) 
88.9%           
(n=162) 
93.5%           
(n=168) 
Respondents from the EU 51.9%**              
(n=54) 
96.8%***              
(n=63) 
93.5%           
(n=62) 
96.9%          
(n=64) 
Respondents from G77/China 70.8%*               
(n=72) 
75.3%***             
(n=73) 
81.7%***            
(n=71) 
90.8%          
(n=76) 
Reason: Fairness considerations of the public 
All respondents 87.9%          
(n=157) 
58.9%          
(n=158) 
41.3%          
(n=150) 
44.4%          
(n=151) 
Respondents from the EU 87.9%          
(n=58) 
44.8%***       
(n=58) 
20.0%***        
(n=55) 
35.1%*         
(n=57) 
Respondents from G77/China 88.9%          
(n=72) 
67.1%**          
(n=73) 
54.5%***         
(n=66) 
43.9%          
(n=66) 
Reason: Facilitation of international climate negotiations 
All respondents 83.1%          
(n=160) 
46.9%         
(n=160) 
49.3%           
(n=142) 
30.8%          
(n=159) 
Respondents from the EU 80.7%          
(n=57) 
28.1%***         
(n=57) 
32.7%***         
(n=52) 
18.3%***          
(n=60) 
Respondents from G77/China 83.3%          
(n=72) 
63.5%***             
(n=74) 
67.7%***             
(n=62) 
32.4%          
(n=68) 
Reason: Pressure from industry 
All respondents 52.9%          
(n=153)  
45.0%          
(n=151) 
69.7%           
(n=145) 
83.9%           
(n=168) 
Respondents from the EU 49.1%          
(n=61) 
61.1%***         
(n=54) 
77.8%           
(n=54) 
85.7%          
(n=63) 
Respondents from G77/China 54.5%          
(n=66) 
32.9%***           
(n=70) 
61.9%*                
(n=63) 
80.8%          
(n=73) 
Reason: Pressure from environmental NGOs  
All respondents 78.9%          
(n=166)  
31.3%          
(n=144) 
29.7%           
(n=138) 
47.4%          
(n=154) 
Respondents from the EU 76.7%          
(n=60) 
19.2%**          
(n=52) 
13.5%***           
(n=52) 
33.9%**            
(n=56) 
Respondents from G77/China 85.7%**              
(n=77) 
43.5%***            
(n=69) 
46.7%***            
(n=60) 
60.6%***              
(n=66) 
 
Notes: *** (**, *) denotes that the relative frequencies differs between the respondents from the EU (or, alter-
natively, from G77/China) and the respondents from outside the EU (or, alternatively, from outside 
G77/China) at the 1% (5%, 10%) significance level according to the appropriate chi-squared test. n = number 
of observations  
   
Table B.7: Maximum likelihood estimates (z-statistics) in random effects probit models, de-
terminants of several reasons playing an important role for the countries or groups of coun-
tries concerning the incorporation of the corresponding most important equity rule 
 
 
 
 
Explanatory variables 
(1) 
Reason: 
Material 
self-inter-
est  
(2) 
Reason: 
Fairness 
considera-
tions of 
the public 
(3) 
Reason: 
Facilita-
tion of 
climate 
negotia-
tions 
(4) 
Reason: 
Pressure 
from in-
dustry  
(5) 
Reason: 
Pressure 
from envi-
ronmental 
NGOs  
Own region -0.66**  
(-2.57) 
0.48** 
(2.05) 
0.54**       
(2.25) 
-0.36 
(-1.57) 
0.07       
(0.23) 
Personal consistency equity rules   -0.18         
(-0.85) 
0.03         
(0.14) 
0.54***        
(2.58) 
-0.46**        
(-2.38) 
0.45*         
(1.70) 
COP negotiator -0.32         
(-1.08) 
0.32         
(0.97) 
-0.12         
(-0.34) 
-1.02***       
(-2.76) 
-0.15         
(-0.31) 
Equity importance 0.19        
(0.70) 
0.36         
(1.24) 
0.20         
(0.66) 
-0.04         
(-0.12) 
0.30         
(0.71) 
NGO -0.09         
(-0.20) 
0.13         
(0.25) 
0.05         
(0.09) 
-0.20         
(-0.36) 
-0.43         
(-0.54) 
Social science 0.72**        
(1.98) 
-0.43         
(-1.30) 
-0.69*        
(-1.83) 
0.45         
(1.19) 
0.21         
(0.43) 
Age -0.43         
(-0.80) 
-0.19         
(-0.34) 
0.28        
(0.46) 
-0.53         
(-0.89) 
0.11        
(0.13) 
Gender 0.20         
(0.64) 
-0.25         
(-0.79) 
-0.20         
(-0.58) 
0.17         
(0.48) 
1.06**        
(2.18) 
GDP per capita 0.19*         
(1.79) 
-0.11         
(-1.03) 
-0.31***       
(-2.62) 
0.02         
(0.16) 
-0.65***       
(-3.85) 
Assessment EU --           
(--) 
1.61***        
(5.76) 
2.03***        
(6.78) 
0.08         
(0.32) 
2.55***        
(6.41) 
Assessment G77/China 1.32***        
(4.58) 
0.13         
(0.50) 
0.39         
(1.41) 
--            
(--) 
-0.08         
(-0.21) 
Assessment Russia 0.71***        
(2.66) 
-- 
(--) 
0.76*** 
(3.10) 
0.13         
(0.47) 
--           
(--) 
Assessment USA 1.15***        
(3.89) 
0.05         
(0.22) 
--           
(--) 
1.07***        
(3.59) 
1.26***        
(3.97) 
EGA most important 0.23         
(0.67) 
0.55**        
(2.00) 
-0.18         
(-0.64) 
0.13         
(0.48) 
0.73*         
(1.92) 
SOV most important 0.58*        
(1.71) 
-0.21 
(-0.75) 
-0.10 
(-0.36) 
0.93*** 
(3.07) 
-0.02 
(-0.06) 
POL most important -0.60**        
(-2.26) 
0.31         
(1.16) 
0.25         
(0.90) 
-0.31 
(-1.17) 
0.95**  
(2.52) 
Constant 1.88         
(0.91) 
0.25         
(0.12) 
-1.74         
(-0.74) 
2.39         
(1.02) 
-1.81         
(-0.56) 
 
Notes: *** (**, *) means that the appropriate parameter is different from zero at the 1% (5%, 10%) signifi-
cance level. Number of observations n=448 (127 individuals) in (1), n=424 (126 individuals) in (2), observa-
tions n=429 (125 individuals) in (3), n=428 (127 individuals) in (4), n=415 (128 individuals) in (5). 
   
Table B.8: Simulated maximum likelihood estimates (simulated z-statistics) in a multivari-
ate (binary) probit model (50 random draws in the GHK simulator), determinants of several 
reasons playing an important role for the countries or groups of countries concerning the 
incorporation of the most important equity rule, number of observations n=349 
 
 
 
 
Explanatory variables 
(1) 
Reason: 
Material 
self-inter-
est   
(2) 
Reason: 
Fairness 
considera-
tions of 
the  public
(3) 
Reason: 
Facilita-
tion of 
climate 
negotia-
tions 
(4) 
Reason: 
Pressure 
from in-
dustry  
(5) 
Reason: 
Pressure 
from envi-
ron-
mental 
NGOs  
Own region -0.31         
(-1.46) 
0.22       
(1.10) 
0.30      
(1.37) 
-0.16         
(-0.82) 
-0.04         
(-0.18) 
Personal consistency equity rules   -0.26         
(-1.52) 
-0.13         
(-0.82) 
0.34**       
(2.06) 
-0.28*        
(-1.77) 
0.35**        
(2.12) 
COP negotiator -0.30         
(-1.15) 
-0.07         
(-0.37) 
-0.55**        
(-2.48) 
-0.41**        
(-1.99) 
-0.48**        
(-1.98) 
Equity importance -0.09         
(-0.40) 
0.29*         
(1.66) 
0.09         
(0.47) 
0.03         
(0.16) 
0.14         
(0.71) 
NGO -0.30         
(-0.71) 
-0.05         
(-0.14) 
0.30         
(0.88) 
0.14         
(0.32) 
-0.05         
(-0.12) 
Social science 0.73***        
(2.85) 
-0.36*        
(-1.86) 
-0.48**        
(-2.40) 
0.52**        
(2.49) 
0.32         
(1.62) 
Age -0.14         
(-0.39) 
-0.48         
(-1.48) 
0.21        
(0.63) 
-0.76**        
(-2.19) 
0.13        
(0.37) 
Gender 0.17         
(0.69) 
-0.26         
(-1.38) 
-0.35*        
(-1.68) 
-0.01         
(-0.03) 
0.72***        
(3.26) 
GDP per capita 0.24***        
(3.18) 
-0.02         
(-0.25) 
-0.29***       
(-4.20) 
0.04         
(0.64) 
-0.52***       
(-6.29) 
Assessment EU --           
(--) 
1.18***        
(5.02) 
1.50***        
(6.21) 
0.11         
(0.50) 
1.58***        
(6.23) 
Assessment G77/China 0.94***        
(3.86) 
0.10         
(0.46) 
0.48*         
(1.87) 
--           
(--) 
0.05         
(0.17) 
Assessment Russia 0.71***        
(2.86) 
--           
(--) 
0.49**        
(2.32) 
0.23         
(1.00) 
--           
(--) 
Assessment USA 1.01***        
(3.94) 
0.13         
(0.62) 
--           
(--) 
0.84***        
(3.38) 
0.82***        
(3.53) 
EGA most important 0.25         
(0.87) 
0.34         
(1.54) 
0.20         
(0.90) 
-0.05         
(-0.21) 
0.46*         
(1.72) 
SOV most important 0.43        
(1.40) 
-0.34           
(-1.55) 
0.26          
(1.08) 
0.51**         
(2.18) 
-0.07           
(-0.25) 
POL most important -0.76***      
(-3.11) 
0.12         
(0.55) 
0.35         
(1.50) 
-0.29         
(-1.33) 
0.29         
(1.20) 
Constant 0.89         
(0.60) 
1.53         
(1.22) 
-1.34         
(-1.04) 
2.93**        
(2.20) 
-1.18         
(-0.88) 
 
Note: *** (**, *) means that the appropriate parameter is different from zero at the 1% (5%, 10%) signifi-
cance level. 
